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. 1·s. 
J]OHN W. TURNER, Warden, 
,Utah State Prison, 
Defendant- Respondent. 
No. ll728 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
1 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Fourth 
judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
; Utah, the I Ionorable Allen B. Sorensen, presiding, which 
: denied the petitioner's application for a Petition for Writ 
! of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that the Petition was repe-
, titive of issues previously considered by the Fourth Judi-
cial District Court and the Third Judicial District Court 
dnd that said Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus was a 
means used by the petitioner for seeking review of his con-
1 vlction which action is contrary to the law of the State of 
·Utah. Petitioner-appellant would contend that this ruling, 
·by failing to consider the merits of his Petition, denied the 
Petitioner consideration of the substantial constitutional 
:l1.iii11 presented by Pe.titian and to which petitioner 
; by the Const1tut1on and Laws of the State of 
,111d by rhe Constitution of the United States of America. 
!sv this 8ppeal, the petitioner requests this Court to con-
;\Jer the constitutional questions raised in his Petition and 
';0 grant his application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
i As a result of a jury trial held February 8, 1968, in 
ithe City and County Building in Provo, Utah, the petitioner 
,·11 as convictecl of the crime of grand larceny, to wit: the 
1 theft of an electric guitar having a value in excess of $50. 00. 
[)uri11g the afternoon portion of the trial, the defendant 
offered testimony from Kenneth Smith that was barred by 
rulings of the Trial Court on the grounds that it was hearsay 
evidence. A proffer of proof was made to the effect that 
the owner of the guitar, Dan Newell, had stated to Kenneth 
Smith that Max M. Johnson had the permission of said Dan 
Newell to take the allegedly stolen guitar from Dan Newell's 
1 srore. On February 13, 1968, the attorney for the peti -
ltioner, Leon M. Frazier, Esq., moved the Trial Court for 
1
a new trial, said motion being based on the contention that 
:the Trial Court's refusal to admit the proffered testimony 
:of Kenneth Smith prevented the petitioner from having a 
I fair and impartial trial by dint of the fact that he was 
!erroneously prevented from presenting witnesses on his 
1
own behalf. ·n1e Affidavit of Kenneth Smith was attached to 
the Motion, describing the testimony he would give if 
allowed to testify. In essence, he would have testified that 
wn Jerald Newell had told Kenneth Smith that he, Dan 
:Newell, had given Max M. Johnson permission to take and 
l:·aise money with the guitar which had been allegedly stolen 
:oy said Max M. Johnson, but that said Dan Newell was dis-
iatisfiecJ with the way Max M. Johnson had disposed of the 
gunar. This testimony had been proffered by and on behalf 
111 Max M. Johnson during the course of the trial, but it had 
ln:c.;11 barred by the Trial Court (Tr. 56-59). The testimony 
:or Kenneth Smith would have been evidence of a statement 
:\:hrch was directly contrary to the testimony given by Dan 
Newell during the course of the trial, (Tr. 9, ll, 16, 17, 18, ..........____ 
19, zo, 21) as to or Max M. Johnson had permis-
·on to take the gm tar 111 quest10n from Dan Newell's store. 
March 1, 1968, after hearing the arguments and con-
siJering the matter, Judge Sorensen denied the Motion for 
a New Trial, and sentenceu the petitioner for the term of 
lnot less than one nor more than ten years to the Utah 
Prison. No appeal was taken. 
111Creafter, on the 16th day of October, 1968, peti-
tioner fileu a Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus in the 
District Court in and for Utah County, challenging the afore-
saiJ conviction for grand larceny. On the 9th day of 
January, 1969, the IIonorable Joseph E. Nelson of the Fourth 
judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
signed an Order effecting the transfer of that Petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County for further consideration. The 
matter was there assigned to the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, who ordered a hearing set on the petitioner's appli-
cation for the Writ of Habeas Corpus for the 30th day of 
January, 1969, at 9:00 A. M., and assigned the Salt Lake 
County Bar Legal Services, Inc. to represent the petitioner. 
LeRoy S. AxlanJ, Esq. , an attorney from that office, re-
presellled Mr. Johnson at that hearing and after hearing testi· 
lmony and consiuering the matter, Judge Hanson denied the 
'
application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus by an Order dated 
;January :31, 1969. 111ereafter, on the 14th day of February, 
11969, LeRoy S. Axland withdrew as counsel for petitioner. 
;on March 1, 1969, the petitioner attempted to appeal Judge 
1Hanson's decision to this Court, but the time for appeal 
I
i naving nm, the appeal was dismissed and the matter re-
manuc:d by an Order issued March 18, 1969. The issues 
i r::iised and determined by Judge Hanson are others than those 
• ra1.:;ed in the instant application for a Writ of Habeas Cor-
1 pus. 
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Thereafter, on July l, 1969, the instant Petition 
tor the Writ of l Corpus was filed in the Fourth Judi-
tiJl District Court 111 and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
as grounds for the application for said Writ of 
H<lbeas Corpus the denial of a fair trial by reason of Judge 
Sorensen's ruling which barred the testimony of said 
Kenneth Smith. This issue had not been raised in the appli-
btion for the Writ of Habeas Corpus heard by Judge Hanson. 
Bv an Onler signed on the 2nd day of July, 1969, Judge Allen 
e: Sorensen of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
rtah County, State of Utah, dismissed the instant applica-
1io1i for the Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that: (1) 
matters raised therein were issues that should have 
raised on appeal, and (2) the application for a Writ 
was a repetitive application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
On July 8th, 1969, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal 
and the record was transmitted to this Court on July 31, 
1969. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
: On February 8, 1968, a jury convicted petitioner 
M. Johnson of the crime of grand larceny. On Feb-
ruary 13, 1968, the attorney for the petitioner, Leon M. 
Esq., moved the Trial Court for a new trial. 
Mte1 a hearing held March 1, 1969, the Motion for the New 
Trial was denied and the defendant was sentenced to a sen-
tence of from one to ten years in the Utah State Prison. 
No appeal was taken from this conviction despite the fact 
that a Motion for a New Trial had been made and denied. 
T:iercciftcr, on October 16, 1968, the petitioner filed a 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court in 
" 11d for Urnh County, challenging the aforesaid conviction 
tor grcrnd larceny. On the 9th day of January, 1969, said 
application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus was transferred 
trnm the Fourth Judicial District Court to the Third Judi-
cial District Court and on the 30th day of January, 1969, 
-4-
'.· 11 ociring into the merits of that petition was held before 
id ,Cc 
! ie Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, a Judge of the Thirl 
District Court after the application for the 
11\irit of rrabeas Corpus was demed. On March l, 1969, 
irhe petitioner attempted to appeal that denial to this Court, 
ltur the time for appeal had run and the appeal was dismissed. 
/-iliercafter, on July 1st, 1969, the instant Petition for the 
'writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in the Fourth Judicial 
I District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
:alleging as grounds for the application for said Writ of 
IHabeas Corpus grounds that had not been alleged in nor 
!passed upon as part of the proceedings on previous appli-
1
,cation for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. This application for 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied by the Honorable 
1 Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of said Court, in an Order signed 
July 2, 1969. This denial and dismissal was made on the 
grounds that the matters raised in this Petition are issues 
that should have been raised on appeal and that the applica-
tion for the Writ of Habeas Corpus was a repetitive applica-
l
tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On the 8th day of July, 
1969, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and the record 
!was transmitted to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. This Court should find that the petitioner was denied 
la fair trial as a result of the denial of his constitutional 
1right to present witnesses on his own behalf and grant the 




THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 11-IAT OCCURRED 
IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS MATTER PRE-
-5-
SENT SUBS'fANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES WIIICI-I SI-IOULD BE EXAMINED BY 
THIS COURT BY MEANS OF THIS APPLICA-
TION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
ln tl1c cnse of Bryant v. Turner, 19 U. 2d 284, 431 
;p,2d 121 (1967), this Court articulated the rule governing 
!the situation presented by this appeal: 
" . . . The writ is, as our rules describe 
it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to protect 
one who is restrained of his liberty where there 
exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the 
requirements of the law have been so ignored 
or distorted that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied what is included in the term 
due process of law, or where some other such 
circumstance exists that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction. " 
19 U. 2d at 286-287, 431 P. 2d at 122. (Emphasis 
added). 
:Tnat case involved the issue which must be first deter-
/mined by this Court; that is, whether or not the issues 
1raiscd in this application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
!will be considered by this Court when they are matters 
!that could have been raised in an appeal of the petitioner's 
co11viction. In the Bryant v. Turner decision, this Court 
!
:reseated the longstanding rule of this Court that the Writ 
of llabeas Corpus cannot be used as a substitute for an 
!appeal. However, as stated by the Court in the language 
quoted above, there are exceptions to the rule; that is, 
Where Lhe situation is an extraordinary one and where good 
.conscience requires an examination of the commitment, 
!this Coun will examine the proceedings to determine if 
itnc commitment is proper. TI1e explanation of this rule 
-6-
iwas well articulated by Chief Justice Wolfe in Thompson 
Iv. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. 2d 761 (1943), rehearing 
Utah 99, 152 P. 2d 91, cert. denied, 324 U. S. 
89 L. Ed. 1406, 65 S. Ct. 67 6: 
"It is often stated that the scope of review on 
habeas corpus is limited to examination of the 
jurisdiction of the court whose judgment of con-
viction is questioned. We must never lose sight, 
however, of the fact that habeas corpus is the 
precious safeguard of personal liberty. That 
jurisdictional questions only are reachable by 
the writ is not such an inflexible rule as cannot 
yield to exceptional circumstances. It may be 
better to say that the rule which apparently 
limits the scope of the writ to jurisdictional 
questions is not a rule of limitation, but a rule 
defining the appropriate spheres in which the 
power should be exercised. Thus, it has been 
held that the writ will lie if the petitioner has 
been deprived of one of his constitutional rights, 
such as due process of law. " 106 Utah at 
144 P. 2d at 7 66. --
I
, It is respectfully submitted by petitioner that there 
two grounds in the record of this case for consideration 
1ot matters in a constitutional sphere in which petitioner 
iwas denied those rights encompassed in the phrase "due 
iprocess of law" as expressed in the Constitution and Laws 
l
ot the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United 
1 
States of America as hereinafter set forth: 
A. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IN THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 12 OF 
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
-7-
STATE OF UTAH AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
ro '11-IE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OP AMERICA APPLIED TO THE STATES 
BY THE POURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, IN THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT IN-
FORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL AND HOW 
HE HAD TO PROCEED TO PROTECT THAT 
APPEAL. 
111e record in this matter shows that the petitioner 
was convicted of the crime of grand larceny on February 
1968. On February 13, 1968, a Motion for a New Trial 
1was filed supported by an Affidavit of Kenneth Smith. The 
!
Motion for New Trial was denied on March 1st of 1969. 
There is no indication in the transcript or any of the record 
/of the proceedings that the petitioner was advised that to 
!
preserve the grounds and matters raised in his Motion for 
New Trial, he must appeal that issue to this Court. His 
ignorance of what was required to appeal is dernonstrated 
by the subsequentive events of this record. To challenge 
this conviction on his own, the petitioner filed on the 16th 
\day ?f October, 1968, a Petition for a Writ of Hafeas Cor-
lus m the District Court in and for Utah County. That etition was denied, after hearing, on the 30th day of anuary, 1969. 111e petitioner tried to appeal his convic-ion, but after the attorney appointed to represent him at 
hearing on his Petition withdrew, he did not know the 
steps to perfect his appeal and as a result his 
tppeal was dismissed for failure to follow the proper pro-
After the denial and dismissal of the instant Peti-
petitioner properly perfected his appeal having learned 
as a result of the prior proceedings. From this, 
l 
his conviction for grand larceny, that Peti-
d1u not allege any of the issues raised in the instant 
; etit10n or raised in the Motion for New Trial. 
-8-
it 15 quite apparent that the petitioner had no know ledge 
nd was not advised as to the proper proccuures for 
:ppeal. Inasmuch as petitioner had counsel at his trial, 
·who made the proffer of proof and motion for a new trial 
. to protect the reconl for appeal, but who failed to file a 
notice of appeal or advise the petitioner to uo so, peti-
tioner would contend that he was denied his constitutional 
right ro counsel as guaranteed by Section 12, Article I 
, of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Sixth and 
•Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States of America. 
" . . we think the only reasonable conclu-
sion to be drawn therefrom is that if petitioner 
had had counsel actively interested in protect-
ing his rights, the result may have been more 
favorable to him. " 
"-111e right of an accused to have counsel as 
assured by Sec. 12, Art. I, Utah Constitution, 
;ind by the VI and XIV Amendments to the U. S. 
Constitution is one of those rights 'rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people, ' as 
essential to the protection of individual liberties 
rtnd therefore included in our concept of due 
process of law. The requirement is not satisfied 
-9-
bV a sham or pretense of an appearance in the 
record by an attorney who manifests no real 
concern about the interests of the accused. The 
entitlement is to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identifv himself with the interests of the defen-. 
dant and present such defenses as are available 
to him under the law as consistent with the ethics 
of the profession. " 
"The failure of such representation for the 
petitioner herein is a departure from due pro-
cess of law. This has been recognized as one 
of the exceptions from the finality of judgments 
and which may therefore be attacked collaterally 
under habeas corpus. " 22 Utah 2d at 21, 449 P. 2d 
at 243. 
j In the instant case, examination of the trial record 
shows that competent counsel assisted petitioner in the 
trial of the case. There is no question about this. How-
ever, the issue now presented to this Court is that of com-
petent counsel in regard to the right to appeal. 
, While this Court has not had an occasion to consider 
'!'this question, it has been the subject of several opinions 
by the Supreme Court of the United States of America. In 
!Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 
814 (1963), it was held that an indigent appellant was 
tentitled to counsel in appealing his conviction. This was 1 
jexpanded by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 
1493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) reh. den. 388 U.S. 924, 18 L. Ed. 21 
:1377, 87 S. Ct. 2094 (1967), which held that appointed coun-
/sel could withdraw only under certain specified conditions. 
1In v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 18 L. Ed. 2d 33, 87 
, S. Ct. 996 (1967), it was held that failure of a State to appoint: 








,0118tituted a denial of his right to counsel and Due Process 
Law. 111e decisions in Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 
£77, 11 L. Ed. 2d 331, 84 S. Ct. 424 (1964), motion for modif. 
Jen. 376 U.S. 936, 11 L. Ed. 2d 657, 84 S. Ct. 790, Douglas 
1,, Green, 363 U. S. 192, 4 L. Ed. 2d ll42, 80 S. Ct. 1048 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1209, 
:;0 s.Ct. 1164 (1959), held that an indigent appellant was en-
, titled to a free copy of the transcript and record for appeal 
lancl Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 6 L. Ed. 2d 39, 81 S. 
Ct. 895 (1962), Douglas v. Green, supra, and Bun1s v. Ohio,· 
'supra, held that requiring payment of filing fees of indigent 
,defendants could not be upheld as being in accord with a due 
:process right to appeal. It would therefore be submitted by 
)petitioner that Due Process and the constitutional require-
1 ments of counsel would require that either the Trial Court 
:or counsel must be required to advise an accused that he has 
1a right to appeal and must further advise him how to protect 
that right or the accused has effectively been denied his right • 
to counsel on appeal as well as his right to appeal itself. 
This is obviously true in any jurisdiction that has a rule 
such as does the State of Utah that will not allow an applica-
ltion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to raise issues other than 
extraordinary issues, which could have or should have been 
raised on appeal. Failure to inform and protect this right 
I 
of appeal is a denial of Due Process of Law. 
B. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN 
THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS CONSTI1UTIONAL 
RIGHT TO HAVE WITNESSES TESTIFY ON HIS 
BEHALF. 
One of the procedural protections encompassed by 
the phrase, Due Process of Law secured to those accused 
:0f crimes in the State of Utah by Article I, Section 12, of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, as enacted into law by 
Section 77-1-8(5), Utah Code Annotated 1953, and further 
-11-
I 
_, ured by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitut1on of the 
! States of America as applied to the states by the 
to .the Constitution of the United 
States of America, is the nght: 
" . . . to have compulsory process to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses in his own be-
half. " Article I, Section 12, Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
111118 is enacted into the laws of Utah by subsection (5) of 
: section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
" . . . to have process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf. " 
: and into the Constitution of the United States of America 
lthe Sixth Amendment, which provides: 
". . . to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, . . . " 
! and is applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 87 
1920 (1967). The similarity of the wording and mean-
ing of these provisions is obvious. Each of them is intended 
toconvey the same meaning, protect the same right, and 
effectuate the same protection. However, while this word-
ing of Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution and 
Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, has not been 
construed by this Court, this provision of the Sixth Amend-
1 ment to the Constitution of the United States of America was 
'construed and held to apply to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
t-merica in the case of Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 
I 8 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967). In that decision, 
-12-
p 
. h court first held that the enumerated right of an accused 
!t compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
is so fundamental to a fair trial that it is incorporated 
!· the oue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
·10 h b h" !The court then went on to state w at was meant y t is 
!phrase: 
"The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, 
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is 
in plain terms, the right to present a defense, the 
right to present the defendant's version of the 
facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so 
that it may decide where the truth lies. Just as 
an accused has the right to confront the prosecu-
tion's witnesses for the purpose of challenging 
their testimony, he has the right to present his 
own witnesses to establish a defense. The right 
is a fundamental element of due process of law. " 
388 U. S. at 19, 18 L. Ed. at 1023, 89 S. Ct. at 
:The precise issue of Washington v. Texas, supra, was that 
!a statute of the State of Texas prohibited testimony for any 
idefendant from any persons charged or convicted as co-
warticipants in the same crime as the defendant; however' 
person could testify for the State. It was held that, as 
above, this was an unconstitutional denial of the Sixth 
right to offer the testimony of a witness on be-
half of the defendant. 
. In Part II of the Decision in Washington v. Texas, supra 
lhe United States Supreme Court carefully outlined the his-
tory of the gradual evolution by Common Law Courts of 
allowing parties to testify. It was carefully pointed 
out that this evolution was based on the idea that the evidence 
•h,ould be presented, and the jury or court should then be 





In the instant case, the erroneous rulings of the Trial 
:court as described in .P.oint of Brief during th_e trial_ 
· nd in denying the pet1t1oner s Motion for a New Tnal demed 
petitioner his right to offer the testimony of his witnesses 
l
'as guaranteed by the Constitution and Laws of the State of 
Utah and the Constitution of the United States of America 
las heretofore described. 
I On the basis of either or both of the denials to the 
petitioner of Due Process of Law as heretofore set forth, 
this Court should consider this Petition for the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and issue the Writ to correct the errors 
that occurred in the proceedings that resulted in the erro-
neous conviction of the petitioner, Max M. Johnson. 
POINT II. 
IN HIS TRIAL ON FEBRUARY 8, 1968, THE PETI-
TIONER WAS DENIED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT PERMITTED TO HAVE TESTIMONY 
FROM WITNESSES ON HIS BEHALF CONTRARY 
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
i As may be readily determined by examination of pages 
1
56 through 59 of the transcript, the proffered testimony of 
Kenneth Smith was ruled inadmissible by the Trial Court 
on the grounds that it was hearsay evidence. It is respect-
fully submitted by petitioner that the evidence offered was 
not properly excluded evidence and this erroneous ruling 
,deprived the petitioner of his constitutionally protected right 
of presenting witnesses for his defense. Had Kenneth Smith 
been permitted to testify, he woold have testified that Dan 







hnson pennission to take the guitar from his store to 
money (Tr. 56-58, Affidavit and Motion for New 
!Trial). This statement was contrary to the testimony of 
1 oan Newell during the course of the trial (Tr. 9, ll, 16, 
/17 18, 19, 20, 21) and was of major importance to the 
once it had been discovered. The testimony of Dan 
!Newell on admitte_d he was a con-
spirator in a plan to raise money by issumg bad checks 
(Tr. 12-20) and this was confirmed by the testimony of Larry 
Rudd (Tr. 46-48, 50-52). This conspiracy had gone sour anc 
Dan Newell wanted out (Tr. 9, ll, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 46-
48, 50-52). The vital question for Max M. Johnson was then 
what were the terms of the conspiracy agreement (Tr. 
!2·20, 21, 47, 49-51). It was admitted that to get the "plan" 
going, there was an initial need for $300. 00 (Tr. 14, 15, 18, 
47, 50, 51), and that Dan Newell gave Max M. Johnson the 
key to his shop (Tr. 7-8, 14, 15-16, 24, 51) so the question 
about which revolved his conviction was whether or not he 
nad permission to take the guitar from the shop. Since it 
was the testimony of Dan Newell that Max M. Johnson had 
stolen his guitar, evidence of Newell's statement that the 
petitioner had his permission to take the guitar was of vital 
importance to the defense. 
I In the decision of State v. Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 
ip· 2d 388 (1957), this Court, speaking through Justice 
:Crockett, stated: 
"The term hearsay is applied to testimony of-
fered to prove facts of which the witness has no 
personal knowledge, but which have been told to 
him by others. He is thus not testifying from his 
own knowledge or observation, but is acting as a 
conduit to relay that of others. The general rule, 
to which there are admittedly many exceptions, is 
that such testimony is not admissible on the grounds 
that it lacks trustworthiness for two basic reasons: 
-15-
0) the person who purports to know the facts is 
not stating them under oath; (2) he is not present 
for cross-examination. Other reasons assigned 
for its unreliability are the danger of inaccuracy 
in the witness relaying what he has been told, and 
the fact that the jury does not have the opportunity 
to see the person whose declarations are offered 
as evidence. However, it is not every instance 
in which a witness relates what he heard someone 
else say that he is purporting to represent that 
the statement he heard is true. The purpose 
of his testimony may be simply to prove that some-
one else made a statement without regard to whe-
ther it be true or false. Testimony of this nature 
does not violate the hearsay rule, since the witness 
is asserting under oath a fact he personally knows, 
that is, that the statement was made and he is sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning such fact. " 
6 Utah 2d at 201-202, 310 P. 2d at 390-391. 
Examining the proffered testimony of Kenneth Smith, 
it is observed that it is capable of two possible characteri-
zations. The first is that he would have testified as to 
matters within his own knowledge or observation; that is, 
the statements made by :Dan Newell. His testimony was not, 
in this view, proffered as to whether or not the statements 
by Newell were true, but only that they were made 
1by him. As this Court stated in the Siebert decision about 
this type of evidence: 
" . . . Testimony of this nature does not vio-
the hearsay rule, since the witness is assert-
ing under oath a fact he personally knows, that is, 
that the statement was made and he is subject to 
cross-examination concerning such fact. " 6 Utah 
2d at 202, 310 P. 2d at 391. 
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resting the profferc? a?ain.st the quoted r_ule, . it 
is clear that tlic basis for objection is not present 111 this 
case. The rule excluding hearsay evidence is based on the 
[actors that the person purporting to state the facts did 
not state them under oath and is not present for cross-
exarnination. Neither of these factors exist as valid obj ec-
tions in the instant case. As is clear from the record, both 
Dan Newell and Kenneth Smith were present in the court-
room. Each could be placed under oath to testify and was 
subject to cross-examination about the conversation. This 
is made even more clear by examining the two leading cases 
on this point in Utah. The first is State v. Siebert, supra, 
and the second is Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P. 2d 
372 (1953). An examination of these cases indicates how 
this rule should be applied. 
In I Iawkins v. Perry, supra, a witness was permitted 
to testify about hearing the purchaser of some property pro-
mise that the property would be taken in the purchaser's 
name until the plaintiff became of age, at which time the 
title to the property would be turned over to the plaintiff. 
!twas held that this was properly admitted, since it was the 
fact of the statement not the truth or falsity of the statement 
that was involved. The situation is even more clearly demon 
strated in the case of State v. Siebert, supra, where a police 
officer was allowed to testify over a hearsay objection that 
1
1 the of the robbery had described the defen?ant' s auto-
mobile m a certain way. A question had been raised about 
inconsistent statements having been made by the victim's 
giving a different description at another time. This Court 
held that the police officer was properly allowed to testify 
about the original description given to him by the victim of 
the robbery. He was held to be testifying merely that the 
'. had been made. However, this Court went on to I it was error for the trial court to have 
i add1t10nal testimony whereby the officer was permitted to 
' 
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tify as to statements given to him by the victim of the 
describing the robbery, the license number of the 
and the conversation between the victim and the 
Tue rationale of this decision was stated to be 
that since a question had been raised as to inconsistent 
statements describing the car, the officer could properly 
testify as to that because he was testifying as to the fact 
that a statement had been made to him, but when he went 
beyond that, he was acting as a conduit passing the vic-
tim's description onto the jury and that was hearsay. A 
new trial was ordered. For further application of these 
principles, see Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. 
welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P. 2d 1011 (1959), and Wilson v. 
Ofclroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759 (1954). 
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is 
clear that the testimony of Kenneth Smith, thus character-
ized, was proffered (Tr. 57 -58) to prove the statement of 
Mr. Newell and its exclusion was not merely error, it de-
prived the petitioner of his constitutional right to present 
the evidence of his witnesses. 
The second possible characterization of the proffered 
testimony is to consider it to be an admission by Dan Newell 
that Max M. Johnson did have his permission to take the 
guitar. If this proffered evidence is characterized as being 
evidence of an admission, it would have the character as 
described in Jones on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Vol. II, 
Section 334: 
"When an out-of-court statement is offered 
in evidence against a party for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the facts asserted in the 
statement, it is readily apparent that the hearsay 
rule is involved and the statement is thus excep-
tionally admitted. Some authorities have treated 
admissions as non-hearsay in character and out-
-18-
side the rule. But it is relatively unimportant 
whether we accept one theory or another, as the 
underlying basis for admissibility. The fact of 
admissibility (on a broad base but with a definite 
limitation that the statement may be used only 
against the party making it) is the important thing. " 
"It is really not necessary to say that the state-
ment must be against some interest of the party, 
although it usually is. The real test is whether 
the statement is helpful to the adversary offer-
ing it in evidence. If it does not help the cause 
of the adversary or hurt the cause of the declar-
ant in the action, it is barred from use, as irre-
levant, as only the adversary may offer it. " 
p. 630 
If the statements of Newell are viewed as admissions, 
their effect on the instant case would be as this Court set 
out in the case of Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272 
Pac. 229 (1928): 
" . . . The evidence which the plaintiff 
adduced as to the admissions of the defendant 
was not adduced nor received to impeach the 
defendant, nor to discredit him, nor merely 
to affect his credibility. It was adduced and 
received quite to the contrary, and as all admis-
sions of a litigant as to a material fact are 
adduced and received for the purpose of establish-
ing the truth of the statements made or the existence 
of a fact to which they relate, and on the theory that 
what a party, as to a matter of fact, has volun-
tarily admitted to be true, may reasonably be 
taken as true, especially as to a matter adverse 
to him, for presumptively a party ordinarily does 
not admit as true that which is against him unless 
-19-
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it is true. And of such probative effect are ad-
missions of matters of fact of a party generally 
regarded when adverse or disserving and volun-
tarily made, as to make a prima facie case to the 
extent of a subject-matter of the admission, and 
to dispense with other proof of the fact so sub-
mitted, and is sufficient to support a finding of 
fact resting alone upon such extrajudicial ad-
mission of a party. . . . " 27 0 Pac. at 235 and 
236 
I While application of this rule would require dismissal of 
1 the action against the petitioner if uncontroverted, it could 
have been subject to rebuttal testimony by Mr. Newell. If 
he denied that he made those admissions, the evidence and 
his denial thereof are proper for submission to the jury, 
which in turn is then free to determine which to believe in 
their determination of the facts. Reid v. Owens, 92 Utah 
432, 69 P. 2d 265 (1937), and 98 Utah SO, 93 P. 2d 680 (1939). 
The main question presented to the Court if the prof-
fered evidence is considered as constituting an admission 
is whether or not Mr. Newell had an interest in the action 
sufficient enough to justify its admission. The Trial Court 
apparently felt that since Mr. Newell was not a nominal 
party to the case, the evidence of his admissions could not 
be admitted under the hearsay rule (Tr. 52). As is pointed 
out in the quoted language from Jones commentary on 
Evidence above, the admission of a party is an exception 
to the hearsay rule. However, Jones also states in dealing 
With the question of whether or not one must be a party in 
order for an admission to be considered as admissible 
1 evidence: 
"Statements by one who is not a party to the 
record may be admitted in evidence on proof 
that the declarant has a substantial interest in 
-20-
the results of the litigation. " Jones on Evidence, 
Fifth Edition, Vol. II, Section 338, p. 638. Cited 
among authorities is the Utah case of Workman 
v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033, 58 A. L. R. 
1346 (192 8 ). 




Miller's Estate, 31 Utah 415, 88 Pac. 338 (1906), evidence 
of admissions of persons not nominal parties, but people 
with substantial interest in the litigation were held to be 
aamissible evidence. 
Applying this rule to the instant case, it is ap-
parent that Mr. Newell, the person claiming that the 
petitioner stole his property had a substantial interest in 
the matter. As such, his admissiof\ should the proffered 
evidence be so characterized, is admissible, and the erro-
neous rulings of the Trial Court effectively denied the peti-
tioner his right to present witnesses on his own behalf, a 
right guaranteed by the Constitutions of the State of Utah 
and the United States of America; a right so fundamental 
that its violation constitutes a denial of Due Process of 
Law. 
CONCLUSION 
\ The erroneous rulings by the Trial Court in this 
lmatter had the effect of depriving the petitioner of the testi-
ony of a witness vital to his defense. This action was can-
ary to the provisions of Section 12, Article I, of the Utah 
tate Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
. 0 the Constitution of the United States of America and denied 
fthe petitioner his Right to Due Process of Law. Accord-
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lllrjily, this Court should grant the petitioner, Max M. 
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